I. Introduction:
This monograph on racism briefly goes through various reports prepared by internationai organizations on the comtemporary forms of racism. It tries to define racism, racial discrimination and racial prejudice as well as ethnicity and ethnocentrism. It dwells on individual and group psychologies in order to understand the underlining mechanisms vvhich may lead to racism in times of acute stress.
We shall attempt in this study to examine the causes of racism in Europe in a historical perspective. As Encyclopedia Britannica (Macropaedia, Vol. 15, points out (and we summarize in the following paragraphs), not only is racism a recent phenomenon in history and the exception rather than the rule as compared to the universal nature of ethnocentrism, it also seems to occur in some parts of the world and not in others.
The evidence that the Indian caste system is racial in origin and that India is or was a racist society is unconvincing. The basic caste dichotomy between "once-born" and "twice-born" was probably related to the cultural distinction between the Aryan conquerors and the Dravidian conquered. The latter were probably darker skinned than the former, but it is not established that this physical distinction was the socially significant one.
The Bible contains no positive suggestion that the ancient Semites vvere racists. The same is true of the Qur'an and the Islamic tradition. Even
In the Middle Ages, the religious criterion of membership in the ingroup became paramount. Anti-Semitism was clearly religious and not racial and continued so through the Renaissance, the Reformation and the Wars of Religion.
The Spanish conquest of the New World was more than averagely brutal, and the economic exploitation was thorough. Today, racism, though not totally absent in Spanish America, is certainly much less prevalent than in other parts of the continent. Cultural criteria are far more important than physical ones in most of Spanish America even in the heavily Indian countries.
Generally, the Portuguese claim that its colonialism in Africa has been nonracial is correct, at least by comparison with the British, Belgian and Dutch. This is not to say that the Portuguese regime in Africa has been any less oppressive and exploitative than the regimes of the other colonial powers, but whereas the latter have frequently applied racial test of discrimination, the Portuguese have been ethnocentric rather than racist.
In Brazil, race relations are quite complex and vary greatly from one region to another. Brazil might be described as a highly racially conscious country but without well-defined forms of racial discrimination. Such discrimination as exists is usually a subtle combination of racial, ethnic, and social-class factors, with race frequently not the most important one.
The French, like the Portuguese and Spaniards, tended to be more ethnocentric than racist in their colonial policy. It should be noted, however, that in Algeria, the French exhibited considerable racism vis-â-vis the Arabs.
The Netherlands and Great Britain were responsible for the growth of the most racist colonial societies that the world has ever known-namely, South Africa, the United States, and Australia.
The anti-Semitic wave that swept Germany in the 1930's ended in the Holocaust, the most heinous manifestation of racism in human history. Although Nazi anti-Semitism grew out of a long tradition of religious intolerance in Europe, Hitler's theory of the master race gave it a hitherto unknown genocidal virulence.
Religion has also been shown to be related to the amount of prejudice and discrimination. There is an undeniable difference betvveen the more racially tolerant Catholic countries of Europe and their colonial extensions and the more racist Protestant countries. The Catholic Church has frequently taken a more universalistic position and rejected racism, whereas many Protestant denominations, especially the more fundamentalistic and puritanical ones, have often interpreted the Scriptures in a racist fashion.
In view of the above, one could understand the rationale underlying the geographic focus on "North America and Europe" in the resolutions of the U.N. Sub-Commission on the Protection of Minorities and the Prevention of Discrimination and "developed countries" in the final resolution of the Commission. Consequently, we have to explain in this monograph how and why racism has developed in a specific part of the world where a brilliant civilisation has been created. This question becomes ali the more relevant in view of the fact that neo-racist manifestations resurfaced almost half a century after the immense sufferings of the Second World War and the Holocaust At first sight, there seems no reason in Europe for deep frustration, regression and projection such as wars, economic depression, political instability or crisis of security. Indeed, Europe is enjoying one of the longest periods of peace and prosperity in its turbulent history. The economic integration process has already reached an advanced stage. Having achieved the Customs Union and the Single Market, EC is heading for the establishment of a common monetary unit, the last phase of an economic union. Europe is already the largest and strongest economic and commercial power in the world. Unemployment is relatively high, but social security and welfare netvvork is quite effective. In the economic field, Europe has high hopes and great ambitions, and justifiably so.
Steps towards political union follow the economic integration with a reasonable time-lag. In addition to goods, services and capital, European citizens circulate freely in the EC, rendering borders increasingly porous. Even if the physical borders of the countries remain, as a result of the political union, psychological borders will further fade and eventually disappear. It is true that the ratifîcation of the Maastricht Treaty, which envisages political and defense integrations, has encountered difficulties. But, the slowdown could prove to be only temporary.
Internally, Europe is a remarkable success story. The European balance of power system which led to two suicidal wars in less than half a century seems to be eliminated for good. Historical enmities, fears and suspicions betvveen European nation-states, especially between France and Germany, are forgotten, making room for intensive cooperation.
Considering the upheaval created by the unification of Germany roughly a century ago, the reunification of Germany this time has had almost no perceptible effeet in and out of Europe.
Externally, Westem Europe has won the greatest victory of ali times without firing a shot in the air. The strongest totalitarian state of history crumbled within, removing by itself the lethal threat it represented for Europe. Newly independent states turned into clients emunating EuropeanWestern values in terms of political democracy, respect for human rights and firee market economy.
Under the circumstances, one expected that Europe should slowly savour the victory. But the resurging racism spoiled the bliss. It also shook the confidence in humanity's future. Were there a potential danger of racism even in these conditions, we could never enjoy any respite in human affairs.
We should perhaps study more closely the undercurrents of this situation in order to comprehend the incomprehensible and make it intelligible so as to restore a measure of certainty and determinism to life.
The number of foreigners is on the constant inerease in Europe. Migration and racism suggest that there is a special correlation between these two phenomena. This would imply that, even if migration does not inevitably produce racism, the former at least contributes to the latter, as the anti-migrant nature of the present racism indicates clearly.
1 European racism is a phenomenon speeded up by the European construction vvhich is in turn sustained by a certain ideal of Europe. The most obscure question is vvhether "to define Europe" necessitates "to define Europeans". This question is ^Ct. Etienne Balibar, Les frontıeres de la dĞmocratie, Paris, La DĞcouverte, 1992, p. 170. essential for the analysis of the institutional and ideological aspects of racism. Europe is a historic problem without a pre-determined solution.
Migration and racism constibıte elements of this problem.
Europe will not be a closed entity (like a federal state or multinational empire), but an open gathering where various economico-cultural groups encounter. This externally open gathering will not be less closed by some internal borders which are invisible, but impossible to abolish. Not only will political borders of the states exist, but also social borders based on the division of labour betvveen different populations. Migrants from the South and the East vvill have different status for economic and ideological reasons. Hence, a European melting-pot or an unstable hierarchical complex of ethno-social groups is emerging.
Europe vvill be the place where political problems of the vvorld vvill be reflected. Among ali European nations, Germany vvill be the one vvhich will face the crisis of the nation-state in the most acute form. Not only because the reconstituting of one nation out of the populations of RFA and RDA is an uncertain enterprise, but also because the Germany of tomorrovv, short of an impossible blocking of immigration, vvill represent in a condensed form almost ali ethnic and social conflicts and tensions of the surrounding vvorld. Under these circumstances, the national (and nationalist) tradition of Germany vvhich has been forgotten or ostensibly forgotten resurfaces as the determinant factor of European history.
2
Racism we face is not a variant of the old forms of racism. But it is a nevv configuration vvhich reflects the characteristics of the social structures and relations of povver of contemporary Europe. For this kind of racism three factors came togethen -the existence of a tradition (of racism) or collective memory, partly conscious, partly unconscious, marked by traumatic incidents, impregnated vvith the history of the culture and institutions, periodically reactivated by historical events vvhich testify to its persistence; -the existence of a discriminatory social structure, not stable, but fulfılling the necessary functions of economic povver structure and at least partially embodied in the organisation of the State; -and fınally, an institutional crisis involving the State and its ideological foundations, the individual and the institutions, affecting his or her identity, vvhich is deeply disturbed, bringing about an intellectual and moral insecurity at the level of masses.
First of ali, we shall look into the situation in which the "tradition" (of racism) has taken root in Europe.
The Evolution of European identity and Racism:
Although nationalism dates back to the middle of the 18th century and at least one hundred years earlier than racism, the evolution of the nationstate had started much before. Nation-state was born to history in Europe. To understand nation-state may help us solve the riddle of racism. Emotional investment of raw and primordial character in the land which the nation inhabited has increased enormously in the course of European history. This has gone hand in hand with the inception and development of private ovvnership. As a result, the diffused borders of ancient empires have turned into the present day frontiers, which are well-defined and rigidly honored. It is clear that the emotional meaning of one's country's borders, unconsciously, is fused with that of one's own boundaries.
3 In other words, State borders which are much better defined in nation-states are unconsciously identified with the boundaries of the individual and the group. This, in turn, contributed to building a more distinct and stronger individual and national identity than had even been possible in the earlier species of States. European integration which aims at a political union threatens on unconscious plane the psychologically ovenvhelmingly invested State borders. Emotions released as a result of disinvestment from State borders strengthen national group identity in a compensatory manner, leading some groups to extreme forms of nationalism and even racism.
The individual in the sense of individualism was also born-or, after Classical Greece, reborn-to history in Europe. The evolution of the nationstate cannot be dissociated from the evolution of the individual. The individual gradually acquired rights and freedoms which protected him from the arbitrary acts and actions of the political authority. This development helped the evolution of the civil society. Eventually, the people made up of individuals destroyed the mythical and mystical foundations of the political power, increased their participation in and finally took över the governance of their countries. Thus, they became cilizens in the constitutional sense. They secularized the religious ethics and morals, legislated lavvs, designating right and wrong, good and bad for themselves.
As a result of this process, a new type of individual and group identity was created in Europe. This identity enjoyed much greater freedom of choice and action, much better protected against the political authority. European individuals and nations became stronger, more productive and more creative actors of history.
But this identity is not more secure and stable. On the contrary, it is quite possible that the European individual feels more insecure, despite, perhaps precisely because of, ali these gains. Historical memory bears the scars of extraordionary violence of the struggle involved in building this individual and group identity. its creation required a more cohesive, even homogenized cultural (including religious) environment. It took revolutions to establish democracy and respect for human rights. Promotion of economic rights, especially right of ownership of land, acquiscing in the enormous inequalities in wealth, and income distribution called for painful adjustments in value scales, especially in religious ones. Coupled with the expanding role of the human intellect at the expense of the faith, these developments reduced the legitimizing, sanctioning and redeeming power of religion.
The main characteristics of this process of identity-building (and identity maintenance) was and is the generation of much greater unwanted and unintegrated self-and object representations, because of regression in times of stress and crises which were not infrequent. Therefore, projection, displacement and externalization mechanisms have overdeveloped as a means of restoring homeostasis or reducing anxiety in the European psyche.
The ethnic groups which for one reason or another did not partake of the same process and failed to create similar identity structures were unconsciously perceived as potential dangers to this identity-building process. The presence of these ethnic groups in the midst of European societies apprarently reminded them by way of example of the fatal dangers of failure in identity-building. This is also true of today's European societies. Guest workers, refugees, and asylum seekers who immigrate in these societies do not have the same or similar identities as Europeans. This difference engenders anxiety in the European individual.
Nevertheless, the presence of other ethnic groups in Europe which are different from the identity-building point of view, served and is stili servingor put to use by-European societies as suitable targets of extemalization onto which they project their unvvanted parts. This enhances the stability and security of the European identity.
Ethnic, religious and minority groups, dominated by Europeans in Europe or in other parts of the world during colonization failed to resist massive projections sustained for long periods and gave in by introjecting them. Once overloaded with the Europeans' unwanted parts, their identity structures broke down and self-hatred installed.
4 Naturally, they craved for a stronger identity. Or they simply apostatized. They rejected their own identities. They wanted to merge into the dominant society. They emulated ali the values of the Europeans, ete.
The denial by the target groups of their own identity and their aspiring to the European identity brought about, not what was sought for, but catastrophe. The retum of the projected material to the European w as felt as psychological annihilation of his identity. The European had then two options, in the depth of the crisis, either to expel or to exterminate the target group.
As a result, homogenizing forces in Europe have över centuries created within vvell-delineated territories (homelands, fatherlands or motherlands) religiously, culturally, soeially and politically cohesive societies.
Western Jews vvere expelled from England in 1290, from France in 1394 and from Spain in 1492. It is true, the Jevvs were not considered as a race, but as a religious community. Nevertheless, psychological mechanisms at work in Spain for almost two centuries which eventually ended up in expelling the Jews offered many similarities with the later pattems of racism. Massive projeetions onto Jevvs have been operated in times of particular stress such as wars, famines, epidemics and the like. Jews have been beaten, killed and compelled to live in segregated quarters. Forced conversions have been frequently resorted to. Once converted, hovvever, their problem has vvorsened. The unvvanted parts of the Christian, vvhich had been projected onto the Jew came back through the Jevv's conversion (boomerang effeet). Then, the Inquisition was established to judge vvhether the conversion of the Jew was genuine or not, i.e., whether he carried the unwanted parts of the Christian in vvhich case he vvas subjected to torture in order to exorcise him of "his" evil parts. Eventually, the expulsion eliminated for good the bomerang effeet of conversion vvhich had become a vital threat to the identity of the Christian.
Jevvs even after conversion vvere not allovved to hold public offices on the basis of "limpieza de sangre" (purity of blood), vvhich foreshadovved one of the most important aspects of racism.
The Muslims vvere expelled from Spain in 1502 and Moriscos (converts to Christianity from islam) in 1609. Thus, "reconquista" of the Iberian peninsula from the Muslims vvas achieved.
The Church as the main homogenizing force in Europe dealt effectively vvith heresies. After having eliminated Arianism, the Crusades vvere organized as of 1208 to eradicate the Cathars in Southern France. The Crusades to the Holy places vvhich had been launehed in 1097 and lasted two centuries created "us and them" in Europe. Ottoman advances in the Balkans and European responses imprinted on the identity of Europeans through chosen glories and traumas the differentiation between "Christian Europe" and the Müslim encroachment. Crusades served as an occasion for vast stereotyping against Muslims, Arabs and Turks vvhose effects are stili perceptible.
We think that it is a valid question whether the same homogenizing forces are at work once again, this time, against the followers of another monotheist religion, namely Müslim migrant workers in Europe.
Religion and Racism:
Racism developed in Western Europe and its colonial extensions in Africa, Asia, Australia and Northern America. Since in ali these parts of the world, Christianity was the predominant religion, it would be interesting to look into this very important aspect of the culture to see vvhether it had anything to do vvith racism.
In the Holy Book, doctrine and liturgy of Christianity there is no trace of racism. On the contrary, racism is an anathema to a religion based on a profound love of God and on love betvveen human beings. Indeed, from the religious point of vievv, it is an enigma that racism has developed in Christian societies.
To Mr. Turgut özal, the late President of Turkey, the Jevvish problem is the key for understanding the role of religions in racism. In his book Turkey in Europe, he says: "It is of the utmost importance that we understand objectively the roots of the Jewish problem for the salvation of a vvorld vvhich is being rapidly westemized.
"The Christian perceives himself in the image of God. Historically, this identification vvith God through Christ crucified for the sins of mankind requires an exceptionally strict ethic vvhich renders it very difficult to house in the soul some vital natural instincts and impulses together vvith God. Is it because of the need to tackle the evil which is embodied in everything negated by this ethic that Jevvry, together vvith oıher groups, was unconsciously used as a target of projection, and hence subjected to segregation, inquisition, and genocide? Let me point out in this context that islam, on the other hand, sanctifies natural instincts provided that their activities be regulated and their abuse prohibited. Historically, this aspect of islam has been sarcastically criticized. Nevertheless, Muslims had little need for a projection mechanism.
"One may say that the Holocaust took place at a time when the grip of religion on natural instincts has been greatly relaxed following the vast secularizing effects of the Enlightenment. This is obviously true. But there might be two connected processes here. Firstly, despite the fact that religion which in the beginning determined the ethics lost ground, ethical behaviour patterns mostly survived, although they have been emptied of religious content. Paralleling this social process, the individual felt, on a psychological level, unconscious guilt mode deeply the more he moved away from ethical premises in his behaviour. In other words, cultural continuity provided the inner need for sanctions in case of breach despite apparent rationalization of the ethics. The only way out was the culturally well-established projection mechanism.
"During the era of the Enlightenment, which is characterized together with Christianity as the basis of Western civilization, the outburst of reason did not only destroy the irrational elements in religion, but partly the religion itself. Deism, even atheism, as by-products implied a return to preChristian conditions with an emphasis on Mother Nature. Is it because of this excessive 'desacralization' that the sacrifıcial cycle of primitive religion has been revived (this time not only for lower-class heretics such as 'vvitches' who had already been subjected to inquisition, but for intellectual elites also) as a result or which hostility was generated towards target groups in the form of persecution and ultimately genocide along with the increase in wars between nation states? "I do not defend the superiority of one civilization över another. Ali I try to do is to point out the social cost involved in what is called progress."^ Considering that Western Europe roughly comprises a Latin Mediterranean and another north-western mostly "Germanic" parts (in historical sense), one should perhaps look for an answer why the latter was more apt to racism despite the fact that both parts have undergone the same or similar individual and national identity-building processes.
Le Monde of 26 December 1992, in its editorial column, refers to the racist and xenephobiac wave of the last autumn in Germany, questions whether these were only a fit of high fever without a future. It says that "although many wished to believe it, the reality was less innocent. Demonstrations, no matter how spectacular and impressive, did not lead to ^Turgut özal, Turkey in Europe and Europe in Turkey, London, K. Rüstem & Brother, 1991, pp. 106-108. calling into question the relations with... 'the other' which remains fıxed in the soul. These demonstrations rather reflected in this country impregnated with Lutheranism, the need of public redemption of a nation vvhich feels sinful."
It is beyond the scope of this monograph to expound the relationship betvveen Protestantism and the increased feelings of sin. It vvould perhaps be enough to point out the concepts of strict ethic, "cali" and predestination as the main characteristics of this creed.
"Combined vvith the harsh doctrines of the absolute transcendentality of God and the corruption of everything pertaining to the flesh (in Protestantism), the inner isolation of the individual contains, ...the entirely negative attitude... to ali the sensuous and emotional elements in culture and in religion."
6 The Catholic ethic (on the other hand) vvas an ethic of intentions. Quite realistically, the (Catholic) Church recognized that man vvas not an absolutely clearly defined unity to be judged one way or the other, but that his moral life vvas normally subject to coflicting motives and his inaction contradictory. Of course, it required as an ideal a change of life in principle. But it vveakened just this requirement by "the sacrament of absolution."
7 The (Catholic) priest "dispensed atonement, hope of grace, certainty of forgiveness and thereby granted release from that tremendous tension to vvhich the Calvinist vvas doomed...The God of Calvinism demanded of his believers not single good vvorks, but a life of good vvorks... There vvas no place for the very human Catholic cycle of sin, repentance, atonement, release, follovved by renewed sin." 8 One should study vvhether the extreme requirements of Protestantisms vvhich vvere humanly almost impossible to fulfill increased the feeling of sin and the need to externalize it onto suitable targets both inside and outside the society.
Another topic of investigation could be the relationship betvveen the strict Protestant (and Calvinist) ethic and the intrusive modes of childrearing including especially excessive cleaning, deliberate and systematic corporal or psychological punishment (as against hitting vvith rage) and breaking the vvill of the pupil in education.
North-Western European societies are usually extremely orderly, clean and vvell-regulated. This can be partly explained vvith the needs of modern technology, public or personal hygiene, aesthetic requirements of architecture and city-planning or safety and security of traffıc. Nevertheless, compulsive traits of this kind of orderliness do not escape the notice. An American novelist who lived in Germany for thirteen years vvrites in an article about three "insignifıcant" personal incidents to point out the potential danger. He concludes: "If Germans get this orderly, even, more anal than usual, it's time to worry. When they start into their orderly mode, watch out, because what is fırst or foremost not in order are ali these foreigners, and when Germans start looking for the causes of their societal problems the scapegoats have the unfortunate fate of turning into lamp shades and medical experiments."9
Compulsive attitudes of excessive orderliness and perfectionism have little to do vvith the reasonable and logical requirements of order. Compulsive people feel bound to comply vvith the "rules" under the censure of primitive super-ego, and hate those vvho are "disorderly", "dirty", "untidy", ete. Moreover, compulsive character is rigid, intolerant and conventional, especially in face of relaxed, casual, carefree and unconformable foreigners. 
Development of Nationalism, Ethnocentrism and Racism in Germany:
Are there other particular causes of racism in Germany? This is vvhat a European vvrites: "(In the West German society) the trend-setters and go-getters ... serambled after the war to leave behind their German identity. People so Europeanized themselves as to become quite unrecognisable as traditional home-spun Germans.
"Cali it a case of almost self-hatred, engendered by the chilling realisation of vvhat had been perpetrated in Germany's name under Hitler's rule. With freedom handed back to a numbed populace, escape from "Germanness" and the affeetations of a culture of 'World Citizens' seemed to many the most tempting route to redemption from the past.
"The bills for so much self-alienation are now falling due. Suddenly, Germans are looking at themselves and vvondering once more about their identity." The denial and rejection of national identity can never be without cost. A universal identity cannot substitute for the national one. A universal identity can make sense only if it is supplementary to a well-founded national identity. In the post-Second World War era, Germany became a fully democratic country and buried the Nazi identity in history. Powerful human rights circles in the country have taken on the task to defend respect for human rights in the vvorld. Most probably, these circles split off this undesirable past from their identity and projected onto those who are supposed to commit human rights violations in other countries.
With new generations and especially vvith reunifıcation, German people might have felt the need to reconstruct the German identity, this time on Üıe basis of democracy and respect for human rights. The search for a nevv German identity vvas bound to draw on the historical experience of German nationalism vvhich had been culturally handed dovvn by one generation to another. Therefore, one should look into the history of German nationalism in order to see vvhether it has anything to do vvith neo-racism.
British and French forms of nationalism grevv from pre-existing bureaucratic structures (States). For "Germany" on the eve of the French Revolution, the över three-hundred-and-fifty separate petty sovereignties vvhich then comprised the nearly defunct Holy Roman Empire prevented any "natural grovvth" of the idea of nationalism.
12
In the Napoleonic Wars, the Germans vvere "humiliated" by the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire (1806), and the later defeat of Prussia (1807). 13 Historians have long knovvn that the conversion of the intellectuals, from European cosmopolitanism or parochial particularism to nationalism, clustered around the years 1805-7, a time in vvhich Germany vvas being assaulted by French arms. It had happened before, sometimes vvith disastrous consequences, as in the Thirty Years War, but the assaults had never resulted in the actual political death of the Holy German Empire. Although the First Reich vvas, in reality, more fiction than fact, on unconscious levels, it symbolized permanence, stability and immortality: it had, after ali, been in existence for a thousand years. Although the German nationalists did not give much conscious allegiance to it, its dissolution could only have been understood as a death episode. The ardour vvith vvhich the studies in Old German vvere pursued helped overcome the spiritual depression. Because the nationalists identified vvith Prussia, her reduction in size after the "humiliating" defeat of Jena, vvas experienced as amputations:
12 David R. Beise, "German Nationalism", The Journal of Psychohistory, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Summer 1980), p. 3. 13 Ibid., p. 5.
"By the Peace of Tilsit", wrote Jahn, "Prussia lost some of her limbs."
14
The struggle for Germany was an oedipal-and sibling-conflict on a monumental scale. "Mother Germany had been "penetrated" by the French (who) were understood, partly consciously, partly unconsciously, as Teutonic brothers. The French vvere "the other branches of the race", wrote Fichte. The French were the hated sibling-rivals who had by violence and military occupation achieved fusion with and sexual possession of the German "mother"...
Such oedipal fantasies and primitive splittings of maternal images into "good" and "bad" self objects are reflected in the extraordinary preoccupation of the German nationalists with the theme of purity. As Arndt wrote:
"The Germans are not bastardized by alien peoples, they have not become mongrels. They have preserved their original purity more than many other people...Tacitus saw...how important was for the future greatness and majesty of the German people that they were pure and resembled only themselves, that they were not mongrels."
Fichte believed that the nation should exist "without admixture of or corruption by, any alien element", and he spoke repeatedly of an "original German stock".
15
The fact that the idea of a German nation was artificially constructed is suggested by many factors, not the least of which was the extraordinary energies devoted to proving it had an objective reaiity. One way was to insist that the nation was an organic entity. It was not the product of reasoned choice, history, social contract, or rational constitution-making, but was imagined to be a natural, organic body pre-existent in nature. "What binds ali members into a whole", wrote Görres, "is the law of nature which takes precedence before ali artificial contracts." Fichte wrote: "People and fatherland ... far transcend the State" which was dead anyway in the politico-legal person of the Holy Roman Empire.
The title of Arndt's 1813 poem "Where is the German Fatherland?" reflects not simply a rhetorical device used for poetic impact, but an anxietyproducing confusion. Reflective of the insecurity Arndt felt in identifying with a "nation", which had no political reaiity, was his taking twice as much space to teli his audience where the German fatherland isn't, as he took in telling them where it is.
The uncertain existence of the German nation meant that Germandom had to be defıned in negative terms by projecting onto the French ali the negative qualities the Germans despised in themselves. They prepared longlists of the negative qualities of ali Frenchmen, so that the Germans might vent their rage against a split-off part of themselves, a feared and despised external object. The French were: "Incapable of eternal ideas, of deep enthusiasm, of blissful ecstasy and human longing, for vvhich they even lack vvords; making fun of the holiest and highest of mankind (presumably the Germans) for the sake of vvittiness". Apparently, the Germanic virtues-most of vvhich vvere emotional, vvere the opposite of these negative French characteristics.
Because the nation vvas not yet a political unit, since it vvas transcendent, organic, and defıned in negative terms, and because it vvas, therefore, an artifıcially constructed entity, the only vvay the nationalist could actually be certain of its existence vvas to feel it.
17
The only concrete example ever offered by the German nationalists to prove the existence of the German nation is the German language as the bearer and proof of Germanic kultur.
18
German nationalists vvere interested in language because of the clear connection it had to their ovvn childhoods. The obvious equation is: maternal group fantasy of the German nation = the German mother tongue = mother. As Jahn vvrote in 1807: "Every man has a mother; a mother tongue is enough for him. Mother love is the first translator of speech; the mother tongue is the open door to the heart, memory and reason." Modern psychology has demonstrated how profoundly language mastery among children, ages tvvo to four, is contingent upon an intimate, loving interchange betvveen mother and child. The German nationalists' obsession vvith language, vvith German as the only Ursprache (original language) left in Europe, vvas an effort to recapture a maternal intimacy earlier experienced. For the original German nationalists-and perhaps for ali nationalists-the issue is alvvays an issue of a particular kind-maternal love.
19
Whenever individuals in groups experience high stress levels, either in fantasy or in reality, the individuals tend to regress to very early levels of childhood ideation. The German nationalists in the Napoleonic period vvere involved in nothing less than a regressive fusion vvith the preoedipal 17 Ibid., p. 6. 18 Ibld., p. 7.
Ibd., p. . mother. 20 We know that, in fantasy, groups are often understood as mothers. When the Germans set out to create a fantasy about their own group (nation), they were, in effect, creating a fantasy vvhich, by definition, vvould be maternal. Since belonging to, and merging vvith, maternal groups can be tremendously anxiety-producing (because they are, in part, experiences that avvaken incest fears), the German nationalists defended against them by euphemistically labeling "mother" Germany "the fatherland".
21
Because of the particular conditions, such as the absence of a unified state structure and clear-cut borders, German nationalism put overvvhelming emphasis on nation, not as a politically objective reality, but as "natural", "organic body", "pre-existent in nature", and "subject to lavvs of nature". This definition of nation based mainly on biological concepts vvas already very close to racism. As a result, purity of the race and the original or unadulterated character of the German language became rallying points of nationalism. Novv, the question is vvhether the foreigners, not only vvith their different manners and vvays of life, but also vvith their creole German are disturbing the obsessive and perfectionist purity of German language.
Germany achieved unification roughly half a century after the emergence of German nationalism. Having defeated the Austria-Hungarian Empire and France, it became the dominant povver in Europe at the Berlin Conference of 1878.
It is beyond the scope of this study to speculate as to vvhether the particular brand of German nationalism led to the First World War. The enormous stress created by the vvar and post-vvar conditions helped the Nazi rögimc to come to povver. This rdgime displayed the most malignant forms vvhich culminated into the Holocaust.
Unlike during the Napoleonic vvars, Germany vvas not invaded by the allied countries at the end of the First World War. Nevertheless, the conditions of the Versailles Treaty vvere not only humiliating, but also not conducive to a recovery from the post-vvar problems. War debts caused a hyper-inflation. The Great Crash had its adverse impact on the economy. Unemployment rose. ideological polarization and political instability ensued.
The depressive mood created by the trauma of the defeat seemed primarily responsible for the rise of Nazism. Contrary to the situation follovving the Napoleonic vvars, at this time the defeated Germany vvas a majör povver in Europe vvith a unitary state structure and a large "fatherland" vvith vvell-established borders. its fledgling ethnocentrism of the early nationalist era had become the main bastion of the Bismarkian Germany. Therefore, the defeat of the First World War was a free fail from the very heights of this ethnocentrism. The regression was equally profound.
Analysis of Racist Theories:
Some other factors had contributed to the depth of regression as well.
The 19th century was swayed by racist theories. German nationalism with conceptual roots of biological nature must have been particularly vulnerable to these theories. Therefore, the response of Germany to the trauma of the First World War was in the form of a deep regression from an overgrown ethnocentrism down to the level of a nationalism which had been largely impregnated with racist theories.
In his The Aryan Myth, Leon Poliakov present us with the very serious problem created by the scientism of the 17th and 18th centuries. In their efforts to apply newly discovered empirical methods to the human vvorld, scientists and thinkers made heroic and dangerous generalization on the basis of such discrete morphological and physiological facts as skin color, shape of the skull, and so forth. In such a manner, Poliakov says, was a rudimentary racism sewn into the very fabric of that scientifıc revolution which so many have seen as being a primary characteristic of the Enlightenment. The generalizations which were made at this time served, as a rule, to place European man at the very pinnacle of human grandeur and achievement. So-called "lesser breeds", such as Negroes and Jevvs, tended more and more to be viewed not as being merely somehovv different from the Europeans, but rather, as being virtually separate species. The overall effect of this was, as Poliakov points out, to strip man of his divinity. From the so-called " Age of Reason" on, man w as, for many, part of the natural vvorld, a fact to be studied, classified and, on occasion, controlled and condemned, much as nature acts to deal vviüı species too grossly ineffectual or too unfıt to survive.
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The "Mosaic Law" had emphasized the fundamental distinction betvveen man, as having been made in the image of God, and ali other forms of life on earth. Somevvhat crude "science" of the Enlightenment had begun a process by virtue of vvhich man came to be seen as not in any way divine, but rather as a peculiarly hairless ape, gratuitously endovved vvith a trifle more gray matter than his arboreal relatives. The particular mythus of race was ilself a product of that reaction to the astringent world of reasoned scientism referred to as Romanticism. Romanticism's world was one of visions, some of them nightmarish to be sure, but a vvorld to be tapped by intuition, imagination and emotion. With illusions damaged or destroyed, men sought refuge from the harsh light of reason in the comforting tvvilight of feeling and imagination. Despite their rebellion against reason, the romantics generally did not seek to restore a lost dignity to mankind as a vvhole. The assumption vvas that each people had something of this quality in it. With Fichte and such devotees of lost Aryan India as Schlegel, the romantic dream, became directed tovvards that hoary search for origins. The dream of return, part of a dangerous longing for the maternal, according to Poliakov, eventually assumed the form of a search for racial origins. An extremely unfortunate tendency to confuse language vvith racial groups was responsible for the concretization of the Aryan Myth.
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"This scientific racism", vvhile a rebellion against the Judeo-Christian tradition, contained those elements necessary for the establishment of a nevv religion, the religion of nature. While it is true that, betvveen 1850 and the First World War, these phenomena vvere vvell-represented throughout the Western vvorld, it is also true that they vvere more heavily represented in Germany. The National Socialists vvere the inheritors of this legacy and the religion of nature informed the thought and actions of Hitler, and the others in the movement. The Nazi ideologists persistently claimed that their movement vvas rooted in health-giving "principles of nature", and thus adherence to it and to its purposes put one in conformity vvith natural lavvs. The Judeo-Christian tradition, vvas being replaced by a nevv religiosity, one in vvhich a putatively biological approach had been fused vvith mysticism. The actions of "natural men" -actions undertaken in conformity vvith the so-called "lavvs of life"-would be self-justifying, and pernicious and soulless representatives of the Mosaic Code could be exterminated vvithout a qualm, since, after ali, these subcreatures existed at the very lovvest level of existence. It vvas thus that Himmler could declare that the "struggle" vvith the Jevvs vvas a "natural one". The nevv "life-course" (Lebensvveg) proffered by the National Socialist Weltanschauung posited an organic approach in vvhich magic-infused mystery and the natural vvorld had been brought together in inviolable synthesis.
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Poliakov in The Aryan Myth offers an explanation for the tendency to attempt to identify man vvith nature. Psychoanalysis, he says, describes the source of this "dream" as follovvs:
before individuation-the stage of "primitive narcissism", when as we are told by those who investigate these obscure beginnings, human universe, and each individual feels himself to be organically the Whole as though he were god in a pantheistic sense. Thus, the childish paradise of total happiness is in the final analysis that of the preconscious life in the womb, before the 'fail' into the vvorld."
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If an ingroup regresses in the face of extraordinary stress to such primitive level as complete maternal fusion, everything in daily life, every adult activity, be it sexual or not, engenders pervasive feelings of guilt. They have to split off and project ali parts of self-and object representations, which are unconsciously linked with the sense of guilt and punishment, onto the outgroup. The purpose of this projection is to create an extreme cohesion in the ingroup that a maternal fusion requires. For, if it is impure, maternal fusion becomes extremely dangerous. So long as the ingroup remains at such primitive level of regression, the process of projection has to be very active. When the outgroup is overloaded vvith the unvvanted parts of the ingroup, the symbiosis betvveen the ingroup and outgroup becomes dangerously complete. Psychologically speaking, the outgroup becomes identical vvith the ingroup. Then, the ingroup has two alternatives: to expel, or to exterminate the outgroup in order to save itself from the feelings of guilt or sin.
Self-denial of the Target Group and Racism:
Another aspect of the problem is the attitude of the outgroup tovvards the projections of the ingroup.
It is interesting to note that the emergence of racism in Europe was coincided vvith or follovved the emancipation of Jevvs in the aftermath of the French Revolution. Having been profoundly frustrated vvith the long discrimination and persecution, emancipated Jevvs tended in great numbers to dejudaize in the prevailing atmosphere of the Enlightenment and to get assimilated into European societies.
The striving middle-class Jevvs had tried to prove that they vvere not "little", "ghetto" Eastern European Jevvs, made out as abasive, constricted, uncivil, uncultured, alien, grandiosely and egocentrically given to magicalreligious phenomena. The secular Jevv, craving assimilation, tended to repudiate in considerable measure his/her Jevvish identity and heritage. Thus, vvith Jevvish identity maimed, the secular Jevv had little inner protection from the noxious psychic implants injected by way of threat and deriding definitions of Jews coming from the host society.
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Until their emancipation in Western and Central Europe during the 18th century, Jews were in groups that were assigned by the larger society a corporate character with obligations, rights, economic functions, and many restraints. With emancipation, individuation and self-actualization became dizzying possibilities. Excited by "the impossible abundance of the new" (Kalka, 1920) ; governed by ambition, a drive for self-fulfıllment, and a gritty determination to reach the apparently newly available goals; exulting that their unique talents were giving rise to one of those rare cultural flowerings of history; attempting to dissociate themselves from Yiddish culture-'tearing asunder the chain of generations", Kafka remarked; having ceded their own tongue, culture, and the knowledge of their past-thus lacking the povver to be in charge of their self-delineation; unsupported by their erstvvhile institutions and customs-and therefore standing naked in any current crisis; often subject to terror, identification vvith the terrorizer, and self-hatred, a psychological sequence that in turn made them knovv shame because of the perennial yen to fınd themselves, vvhatever their attainments, ambivalently regarded vvhen not disregarded; and enduring chronically the vvorry that sanctuary vvould forever elude them. In the air vvas the foreboding that they and their descendants vvould be hunted dovvn, cankered, and killed (cf. Appelfeld, 1980). They had surrendered their past, and there vvas to be no future. In his diary Kafka comments that since the inspiration for their creativity derived from a uniquely Jevvish despair, the creation could not be part of German culture because the problem vvas not really German. Kafka's Metamorphosis depicted that the Jevv's ovvn definition of himself reflected the appraisal by the host people: he vvas a bug, vermin, pollutant, sub-human, an embarrassment in the host's home. 28 Despite some similarities betvveen the expulsion of the Jevvs from Spain and the Holocaust, there are some important qualitative and quantitative differences. Unlike the forced conversions in the Spain of the 14th and 15th centuries, the Jevvs of the XIXth and the early XXth centuries chose to merge vvith the Christians by themselves. By doing so, they have abandoned the last and most important bastion of their identity, the religion. The disappearance of the borders betvveen the Jevvish and the Christian identities brought back to the Christian psyche the centuries-old unvvanted parts vvhich had been projected onto the Jevvs. The unvvanted parts thus returned to the Christian must have been reprojected onto the Jevvs in greater volume and mass, dangerously destabilizing inter-ethnic relations vvhich vvere 27 Stanley Rosenman, "The Late Conceptualization of the Self in Psychoanalysis: The German Language and Jevvish identity", The Journal of Psychohistory, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Summer 1983), pp. 13-14. 28 Ibid., further exacerbated in the aftermath of the First World War, and led to the Holocaust. What had happened in tvvo centuries in Spain was condensed into two decades in Germany, which fact greatly enhanced the density of the violence.
Another, perhaps, more important reason why the Holocaust was incomparably more savage was that the level of regression of the ingroup was much deeper in the second case. The discourse of the genocide was no longer religious, but biological, blood-based and nature-oriented. This layer represents in humanity's evolution more primitive, pre-culture, even primordial phase much earlier than monotheist religions. Expulsion of Jews from Spain, on the other hand, was the result of a basically religious conflict with racist overtones.
Half a century has elapsed since the Second World War. Germans, probably like ali groups attaining a strong identity, formed it initially in a binary, narcissistic, contempt-laden, competitive, anxiety discharging fashion marked by excessive projections and introjections in relation to another group (cf. Klein, 1932 Klein, , 1948 Jacobson, 1964; Friedlander, 1978; Stein, 1980) . The challenge for a maturing group is to go beyond this early developmental stage, to realize that the negatively regarded outside group possesses some virtues, and the native group is subject to defects ascribed to the other. In short, the two groups possess a common humanity.
Nevertheless, Germans had to confront, after the First World War, yet another devastating trauma in the Second World War which impeded this maturing process. In the aftermath of this war they regressed almost to the pre-national stage, i.e., European cosmopolitan nationalism of the early 19th century. They repudiated their German identity in favour of a Europeanized or universal identity. This coincided with the European integration which mobilized efforts to build up a nevv European identity, if necessary, at the (partial) cost of national identities. At this juncture, ultra-right centripetal forces emerged in Germany as in some other EC member countries. They presently strive to reinforce the German national identity. It is evident that the return of the national identity cannot be dissociated from the historical experience of nationalism which has been intimately mingled with racism. In other words, German nationalism comes back once again together with the symptoms of racism. The search for the national identity vvhich has been repudiated because of its connection with humiliating events cannot be achieved without feeling the pains of the narcissistic wounds that these events have caused. Narcissistic wounds, in turn, trigger defensive mechanisms especially in the form of ethnocentrism. But ethnocentrism or its regressed form, i.e., racism had brought about these catastrophes in the first place, hence the reason why panicky fears of ali Europeans accompany the resurgent racism.
Neo-Racism in Europe and European Integration:
Since racist incidents do not occur only in Germany, but in other West European countries, albeit on smaller scale, one should look into the causes of racism in other parts of Europe vvhich do not entirely share the same historical experience vvith Germany in terms of nationalism and identity-building.
Racism vvith reference only to the past cannot explain the causes and the structures of new racism. As vve have pointed out earlier, presently, there is no visible stress-generating situation. On the contrary, the EC Europe is living a prosperous and peaceful period. It has already become the largest economic and commercial entity in the vvorld and is moving fairly successfully tovvards political union. What is causing regression and projection in Europeans is not easy to understand.
In Europe there is an institutional discrimination based on the structure of employment. Private sectors in Europe reduce the cost of labour by importing a part of manpovver from peripherical regions of the vvorld vvhere there has been no trade union rights as those enjoyed by European vvorkers for more than a century. Apparently, the EC officially maintains this differential system vvhich constitutes "ethnicisation" of the hierarchy and the inequities in the labour force. The "subjective" counterpart of this situation is the institutionalisation of racist and cultural prejudices betvveen the dominant and the dominated segments. 29 Migrant vvorkers had been massively recruited and employed in certain jobs. Novv they seem to have settled in Europe for good. Family reunifications have been realized. The second, in some cases, the third generation started to enter the labour market. Just at this moment, they have to face rising unemployment created by a technology vvhich reduced the need for unskilled labour. This unemployment does not only affect the guest vvorkers. Rapid technological change impairs the job security of ali vvorkers, and necessitates recurrent training for frequent change of profession together vvith ali its inconveniences. The consequent competition betvveen "national" and "foreign" vvorkers in the manpovver market also contributes to racism.
Foreign vvorkers deprived of the protective umbrella of their ovvn states and enjoying only restricted rights are also racially despised and treated as sub-humans. Indignation and contempt, they feel, induce them to embrace more closely their traditions and religion in a defensive mood. Host people naturally sense this defiant reaction and react, in turn, with increased racism. As a result, both sides engage in an escalation in their respective attitudes.
29 Balibar, op.clt., p. 183.
In this context, the effects on the host people of the crisis the State undergoes comes into the picture. The contemporary form of racism is not a simple relationship vvith the "other" based on a perverted perception of cultural or social difference. It is a relationship vvith the "other" mediated by the intervention of the State. Or more clearly (this is basically an unconscious dimension) it is a conflictual relationship vvith the State vvhich is experienced in a deviated manner, by means of "projection" onto the other.
In this light, one can explain the slogan of "national preference" raised by the French extreme right. This preference is both a fantasy and an institution vvithin vvhich citizens perceive their special relationship of dependence on the State. None of us can totally escape this situation, especially if vve are less privileged, discriminated against, treated as subjects by the administration, school, political machinery and the like.
The State in Western Europe established a correlation betvveen the rights of the citizen and nationality, on the one hand, individual and collective social rights, on the other. As a result, only the nationals of a State enjoy full social rights.
The question of vvhat is presently the State in Europe is essential in understanding racism. The State in Europe is neither national, nor supranational, and this ambiguity is grovving instead of diminishing. In the distribution of povver betvveen national States and Community institutions, it seems, there is competition. But in reality, this is a process in vvhich the State is disintegrating. its povvers and responsibilities are shrinking. It is striking that in the construction of Europe there is no real social dimension, except in rhetoric: the European State as social State is sought neither by market forces, nor by national govemments.
As a result, there is the State vvith ali its administrative practices, repressive capacity and arbitration role betvveen interests (including betvveen the national interests and those of the classes) vvhile there is no State in the real sense of the vvorld, i.e., "dtat-providence". In many respects, it looks like a situation vve are used to seeing in the Third World. Thus, ali the conditions come together to produce a collective sentiment of identity crisis. Although one nıay say that individuals, especially those vvho are deprived and distanced from political povver, fear the State, but they fear more from its disintegration and disappearance.
In the European space of today, there are individuals vvho are citizens and others vvho are subjects (vvithout political rights). But the former are the citizens of an unexisting-or disappearing-State vvhile the latter cannot be maintained in a situation of "no rights". This untenable situation vvhich contributes to racism vvill last so long as the question of vvhat the people is in Europe is not ansvvered.
The State in the psyche of the individual and the group represents both paternal and maternal characteristics. Generally speaking, the State which protects the population against foreign enemies and maintains law and order is paternal. The State that provides jobs, education and health services and ensures social security and justice is perceived as maternal. On the other hand, the individual and the group selves are identified vvith the State as the sovereign power representing the nation and the country. Volkan fınds closer to modem psychoanalytic stand the view that the State itself represents in the long run an idealized self.
30 Therefore, the disintegration of the state, be it real or imaginary, is felt as the disintegration of the identity.
But the erosion of the State identity is a long-running process. The phenomenon of globalization in the vvorld economy gradually reduced the efficiency of economic policy instruments of the nation-state. Parties of national currencies are floating. Interest rates can hardly be determined nationally. Half of the vvorld output is produced by multinational companies vvhich make investment decisions in place of the governments. Employment in a given country is becoming increasingly dependent on the high productivity, discipline and low real vvages of the labour force, for international investment prefers only the countries vvith such labour force. Full employment has become an obsolete objective.
Despite noises of protests against protectionist pressures or measures, tariffs of industrial goods have gone dovvn from an average of 40 % in the 1950's to 6 % novv. The volume of trade has increased annually tvvice as high as the output, thus becoming the engine of economic grovvth. Countries vvhich have adapted their economies to trade liberalization and competition become successful. But structural adjustment required by international competition leads to the phasing out of obsolete or inefficient industries or lines of production and to massive lay-offs.
The neo-classical economic policies based on the "smaller state" and "non-interventionism" together vvith the reduced scope and efficiency of government economic policies are perceived by the people, especially by those who suffer unemployment and insecurity, as the gradual disappearance of the State, or rather the maternal and protective aspects of the State.
EC countries like other countries in similar situation have to face these challenges of the modern vvorld. So, there is nothing special vvith this for Europe, except that European vvorkers have to compete vvith foreign vvorkers in their ovvn countries as vvell. But this argument should be qualified in vievv of the fact that the division of labour in the manpovver market is effected on ethnic lines, i.e., unskilled jobs left mostly for foreign vvorkers.
Racism can not be reduced to competition betvveen national and foreign vvorkers in times of economic stagnation and unemployment. Othervvise, it vvould be difficult to explain vvhy there is no racism in other countries in similar or even vvorse situations. Moreover, national vvorkers could vent their grievances against foreigners in more peaceful vvays than beating, killing and burning them. Let us not forget that racist incidents are not perpetrated by vvorkers vvho are supposed to face the competition of foreigners.
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In the EC Europe, vve have ali these phenomena and something else. As vve have pointed out, Europe is heading for a political union through economic integration. Integration is achieved through a process of transferring State povvers and prerogatives to Brussels. As a result, the Community institutions have acquired many attributes of the State as a supranational authority. Nevertheless, Brussels has not yet become the source of the nevv European identity replacing the identities of the nation-states or embracing them. Allegiance of individuals is stili directed tovvards their States. Thus, a tension emerged betvveen the center, becoming depositary of 31 It is important to distinguish racism from other conflicts. In the resolutions of the Sub-Commission, vve are given to undersiand that racism is directed against "indigenous peoples, migrant vvorkers, other minority and vulnerable groups". Hovvever, if these groups are involved in a conflict vvith majorities över political povver, economic resources or land, vve could not alvvays talk about racism vvhen vve refer to the treatment given by the majority to the target group. For instance, two ethnic groups may vvage an atrocious vvar över a territory and commit ali kinds of crimes including ethnic cleansing. Mutual hatred thus generated looks very much like racial hatred. Nevertheless, in this case, there is "real" reason for hatred, for mutual violence is bound to breed mutual hatred. The ideal form of racism, hovvever, pre-supposes the "innocence" of the target group in terms of the absence of a conflict över a tangible asset vvith the rest of the society. In its purest form, victims even do fight back. Their very existence or presence seems to be the only cause of racist attacks. Although target groups do not constitute a "real threat" to the society, racists genuinely perceive them as threat and try to rationalize their racial hatred and related violence. Historically, Jevvs have been accused of committing deicide, ritual child murder, poisoning vvells, ete. Presently, as in the past, members of the target group are despised as ugly, smelly, lustful, dirty, disorderly, noisy, lazy, sinister, criminal, terrorists, ete... In the nevv forms of racism, "invasion" of foreigners and the resulting economic cost and job loss for the host country peoples are added to the list to explain racist incidents. The alleged causes of racism do not look very convincing, and normally should not justify racist violence of such disproportionate nature. In vievv of the fact that cause-effect relationship in racist arguments is greatly missing, pseudo-causation underlying racial hatred and violence appears one of the essential features of racism.
State povver without primary allegiance of the peoples, and nation-states, being deprived of power but retaining the source of national identity.
Any integration into a broader entity presupposes a parallel disintegration into smaller entities. This is what is happening in Europe for the last thirty-fıve years on real or imaginary plane. The importance of historical regions and the long forgotten identities of ethnic groups are on constant rise. They claim to be the building blocks of the new European architecture. In other words, not only the state disappears in Europe, but the national unity is consciously or unconsciously perceived as disintegrating into regions and ethnic minorities.
As we have said, the disintegration of the nation-state is psychologically identifıed with the disintegration of the individual identity and felt as an extremely painful process. It is true that, at first sight, there is no trauma which can cause regression in European peoples and trigger projection mechanisms against outgroups. There has been no suicidal war like the First World War, nor can we talk about the disintegration of the State in the sense of the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire. On the contrary, Europe is marching triumphantly towards the age-old dream of politico-economic union, becoming one of the most povverful entities in the vvorld. Yet, the process of integration-cum-disintegration brings about a regression as profound as only a disastrous trauma can do. Ultra-right parties or movements emerged as a reaction to this process and started defending the integrity and the unity of the country. These forces seemed to be more against foreigners than separatist tendencies of the ethnic groups. They regard foreigners as a real threat to their national existence. At first sight, this may look bizarre. But, in democracy, respect for human rights and freedoms may discourage attacks against ethnic groups. The hatred one feels tovvards disintegrating forces can be displaced onto foreigners. By asking for their expulsion, one unconsciously aims at cleansing the ethnic groups of separatist intentions and thus restoring the lost cohesion to the country. In this respect, racism of the extreme right, but also of the majorities in EC countries, may be a response, though defiected and distorted, to the disintegration of the nation-state, by putting the blame on foreigners for spoiling the purity, if not the unity of the nation.
Racial Violence of the Lovvest Segment of the Society:
As the UN report puts it, the manifestations of xenophobia, rejection or latent conflict are the expression of an existential discontent and have spread throughout the country and into ali social strata, threatening to leap across the barrier into genuine, aggressive and assertive racism at any moment. We have tried to explain above society-wide racism and its causes in Europe.
Although a noticeable number of people from the higher strata also express racist feelings about foreigners, such as "repulsive like bugs", "littering everywhere", "soiling our country", racial violence in many European countries, especially in Germany, is generally manifested by the lower strata of the society. These strata consist mainly of unemployed, dropout, rejected and marginalized young people in a highly competitive and compulsive society. Apparently, in the absence of an ethnic group such as Jews who could serve as target for externalization, European peoples in general, Germans in particular, redirected some of their projections at the lowest strata of their societies.
In a country where a universal or Europeanized identity has replaced a historically crippled national identity, and the State as maternal entity (especially for this group) is disappearing, it is understandable, if not acceptable, for the lowest segment of the society to raise the banner of extreme and aggressive nationalism in order to stress its allegiance and its belonging to the society proper. Grass says, "so the vveakest of East and West Germany got thrown to the bottom, they are fighting to be above somebody or really anybody. The hate betvveen Germans is the root cause of this violence. But they know that they cannot take on the other Germans. So, they go for the vveakest. And who is beneath them? The foreigners".
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The reunification of Germany seems to have given a boost to the racist resurgence. During their separate existence, people in West Germany apparendy used GDR as a receptacle for dumping unwanted parts. The "vvall" dividing West Berlin from the East served as a symbolic "censor" betvveen unconscious and conscious or id and ego, preventing the return of undesirable material. The demolition of the wall and the inundation of the projected parts must have been unconsciously felt as a fatal threat to the West German identity which had been purified from the Nazi past and made democratic and civilized. As a result, people in the West engaged in a desperate process of reprojecting the returned material onto foreigners, asylum seekers and refugees. Some of this material was also redirected at East Germans who were accused by their brethren of being racist, among other vices, on the ground of their long deprivation of freedom and democracy. This reprojection in the form of harsh criticism of the Easterners by the Westerners might give impetus to racism in the East. Marginalized segments of a population, who already felt rejected, vented their rage and hatred on foreigners.
The racists vvith their acts of violence wish to teli the better-off strata in their countries: look, we are of the same nation and the race; these foreigners are not of us; they should be unemployed, dropout or rejected ones in our place. Migrant vvorkers vvho are usually hard-vvorking, thrifty and disciplined arouse in the lovvest stratum an envy and hatred vvhich further contribute to racist violence. What is more, the German "State" itself brought these foreigners. If vve take the family imagery, foreigners are neither kin, nor step brother, nor adopted children. The ingroup may perceive them perhaps as servants. The fact that these "servants" vvant to have equal rights vvith the members of the family might also play a part in the rising racist feelings. The hatred that some members of the ingroup felt against the state (their parents) as responsible for this situation might also be displaced onto the outgroup in a regressive racist manner. It is alvvays easier to displace one's anger at one's parents onto the members of an outgroup, i.e., migrant vvorkers.
In this process, the racists project onto the foreigners ali the accusations their compulsive societies make tovvards them. They say not us but foreigners are dirty, disorderly, lazy, ugly, lustful, ete. Nevertheless, by projeeting these qualifications onto foreigners, they don't try to become any eleaner, orderly, hardvvorking and the like. They keep these negative character traits vvhich novv constitute their identity as a result of the projeetions onto them by the society and introjection by them. Instead, they put emphasis on racist and ultra-nationalist concepts as forces binding them to the society vvhile maintaining their identity.
Declining Inter-European Hostility and Racism:
A majör objeetive of the European integration vvas to eliminate hostilities betvveen the European nation-states vvhich brought about suicidal vvars. Franco-Germanic enmity vvhich played such an important part in German nationalism and in the subsequent vvars seems to fade away and make room for intensive cooperation vvithin the EC. The same development is observed in other member countries' relations vvith Germany, and in the relations betvveen themselves. It is quite possible that these historical feelings of hostility betvveen European nations vvhich have been gradually released by the process of European integration might be greatly displaced onto the Soviet Union during the Cold War. It is also possible that, especially after the fail of Communism, these rejected or redundant feelings of hatred might be externalized onto countries vvhere human rights violations are committed. Perhaps, it is not a coincidence after ali that most immigrants are from the latter group of countries. Hence, foreigners in Europe might be facing racism vvhich partly dravvs on the displaced hostility onto their countries of origin or vice versa.
Especially after the collapse of the Soviet "enemy" which served as a stabilizing factor for the European identity by receiving projections, the unconscious need for nevv enemies must be deeply felt. The fail of Communism has different effects on different parts of the vvorld. For example, the ideological terrorism in Turkey turned into ethnic terrorism as soon as the bells of doom rang for the Communist ideology in the Soviet Union. Likevvise, European nations in the process of integration may novv be vvithdravving their hostile projections from the Soviet Union as the embodiment of the anti-national Communist ideology, and reprojecting them onto groups vvith grovving extreme nationalism or fundamentalism, among them, Müslim ones.
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The Middle East conflict has kindled for half a century profound sentiments of hostility, not only betvveen the Muslims and the Jevvs, but betvveen the former and the Christian West. Terrorism resorted to by the vveaker party has increased the resentment and damaged the image of the Arab in the West. Religious fundamentalism partly as a reaction to the West, partly as a response to the disappearance of the ideological alternative to the West, has further vvidened the gap of mutual misunderstandings.
It is a gimmick of history that at this moment the majority of the foreigners living in Europe are Muslims, follovvers of another monotheistic religion vvho replaced the Jevvs that had been exterminated only fıfty years ago. These foreigners, moreover, concentrated in Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, France and Great Britain, countries vvhere there have alvvays existed traditional forms of racism, though in varying degrees. Therefore, there is novv an intensifying interaction and overlapping betvveen the projections made onto Müslim groups in Europe and onto the Müslim fundamentalist enemy image developing vvith respect to their countries.
Because of these developments, migrant vvorkers in Europe display an increasingly profound attachment to their nationalism, cultural traditions and faith. We observe that Europeans in general and Germans in particular can respond less and less emphatically to this basically regressive defense of the foreigners. Indeed, their response is becoming equally, if not more, regressive, i.e. racism. Ali of us have to keep in mind that assimilation of an ethnic group is an abysmal trap that Europe has fallen several times in the past. Since expulsion or extermination is out of the question in the contemporary vvorld, the only exit is to develop empathy tovvards foreigners. Empathy, in turn, calls for the vvithdravval of one's projections of one's unvvanted parts and sharing the humanity of others.
